Natural Language Steganography and an "Al-complete" Security Primitive

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Oct-03 - Apr-04

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References

Natural Language Steganography and an "Al-complete" Security Primitive

for reference, see:

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bergmair.cjb.net/ pub/
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References

Natural Language Steganography and an "Al-complete" Security Primitive

for reference, see:

 Richard Bergmair and Stefan Katzenbeisser. Towards human interactive proofs in the text-domain. In Kan Zhang and Yuliang Zheng, editors, *Proceedings of the* 7th Information Security Conference, volume 3225 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 257–267. Springer Verlag, September 2004. Available online:

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http:// bergmair.cjb.net/ pub/
towhiptext-proc.pdf
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Cryptosystems are designed to protect our sensitive data from evil adversaries.

Cryptosystems are designed to protect our sensitive data from evil adversaries.

Wrong!

Cryptosystems are designed to protect our sensitive data from evil adversaries.

Wrong!

...well, maybe not.

Cryptosystems are designed to protect our sensitive data from evil adversaries.

Wrong!

...well, maybe not.

..., but then again...

Cryptosystems are designed to protect our sensitive data from **evil** adversaries.

What is "evil"?

What is "evil"?

What is "evil"?

"Hacker ethics" is about a **good** individual in a **bad** society.

What is "evil"?

"Hacker ethics" is about a **good** individual in a **bad** society.

"Witch hunt ethics" is about a **bad** individual in a **good** society.

Cryptosystems are designed to protect our sensitive data from evil adversaries

Cryptosystems are designed to protect our sensitive data from evil adversaries

like

the evil spy intercepting sensitive communication

Cryptosystems are designed to protect our sensitive data from evil adversaries

like

- the evil spy intercepting sensitive communication
- the criminal fraudster replaying banking transactions

Cryptosystems are designed to protect our sensitive data from evil adversaries

like

- the evil spy intercepting sensitive communication
- the criminal fraudster replaying banking transactions
- the nosy neighbor reading your mail

Cryptosystems are designed to protect our sensitive data from evil adversaries

like

- the evil spy intercepting sensitive communication
- the criminal fraudster replaying banking transactions
- the nosy neighbor reading your mail

good individual / bad society?

Stegosystems are designed to hide our sensitive data from evil adversaries

Stegosystems are designed to hide our sensitive data from evil adversaries

like

 the evil government censor infringing on our right to freedom of opinion and expression.

Stegosystems are designed to hide our sensitive data from evil adversaries

like

- the evil government censor infringing on our right to freedom of opinion and expression.
- the greedy employer limiting our access to computers and anything which might teach us something about the way the world really works.

Stegosystems are designed to hide our sensitive data from evil adversaries

like

- the evil government censor infringing on our right to freedom of opinion and expression.
- the greedy employer limiting our access to computers and anything which might teach us something about the way the world really works.

good individual / bad society!

- Evil spies,
- criminal fraudsters, and
- nosy neighbors

do not control your communication channel!

- Evil spies,
- criminal fraudsters, and
- nosy neighbors

do not control your communication channel!

- Evil governments and
- greedy employers

do!

A shift in perspectives:

A shift in perspectives:

Alice and Bob do not control their communication channel.

A shift in perspectives:

Alice and Bob do not control their communication channel.

Wendy the warden does!

What happens if Eve the eavesdropper intercepts a secure cryptogram?

What happens if Eve the eavesdropper intercepts a secure cryptogram?

Nothing!

What happens if Eve the eavesdropper intercepts a secure cryptogram?

Nothing!

the evil spy won't know the sensitive information

What happens if Eve the eavesdropper intercepts a secure cryptogram? Nothing!

- the evil spy won't know the sensitive information
- the criminal fraudster cannot read the banking transaction

What happens if Eve the eavesdropper intercepts a secure cryptogram? Nothing!

- the evil spy won't know the sensitive information
- the criminal fraudster cannot read the banking transaction
- the nosy neighbor won't see the contents of your mail

What happens if Wendy the warden intercepts a secure cryptogram?

What happens if Wendy the warden intercepts a secure cryptogram?

Serious consequences!

What happens if Wendy the warden intercepts a secure cryptogram?

Serious consequences!

What will witch-hunt ethics assert about the presupposedly bad individual in the good society, who seeks to conceal the content of his communication?

What happens if Wendy the warden intercepts a secure cryptogram?

Serious consequences!

What will witch-hunt ethics assert about the presupposedly bad individual in the good society, who seeks to conceal the content of his communication?

That Alice and Bob have something evil to hide!

What happens if Wendy the warden intercepts a secure cryptogram?

Serious consequences!

the greedy employer will fire Alice and Bob

What happens if Wendy the warden intercepts a secure cryptogram?

Serious consequences!

- the greedy employer will fire Alice and Bob
- the evil government will send Alice and Bob to Guantanomo Bay

What happens if Wendy the warden intercepts a secure cryptogram?

Serious consequences!

- the greedy employer will fire Alice and Bob
- the evil government will send Alice and Bob to Auschwitz

What happens if Wendy the warden intercepts a secure cryptogram?

Serious consequences!

As long as there is a way for Wendy to tell ciphertext from cleartext, Alice and Bob will not live in peace!

What happens if Wendy the warden intercepts a secure cryptogram?

Serious consequences!

As long as there is a way for Wendy to tell ciphertext from cleartext, Alice and Bob will not live in peace!

Solution: Alice and Bob must use steganographic methods, rather than purely cryptographic ones, in order to hide not only the content of a message from the adversary, but its very existence!

The difference between a cryptogram and a steganogram, is that a steganogram always appears innocuous to Wendy.

The difference between a cryptogram and a steganogram, is that a steganogram always appears innocuous to Wendy.

But what is **innocuous**?

The difference between a cryptogram and a steganogram, is that a steganogram always appears innocuous to Wendy.

But what is **innocuous**?

In the simplest case Wendy has a list of innocuous cover symbols.

C = { Midshires is a nice little city, Midshires is a great little city, Midshires is a fine little city, Midshires is a decent little city, Midshires is a wonderful little city, Midshires is a nice little town, Midshires is a great little town}.

If $c \in C$, then Wendy knows that c is innocuous.

Alice wants to send Bob a message $m \in M$.

Instead of enlisting $C = \{Midshires \ is \ a ...\}$:

- We know an innocuous sentence $c = \{Midshires is a nice little town, \}$
- We have a dictionary, that tells us that the words
 { nice, great, fine, decent, wonderful} and
 { city, town} are synonymous, i.e. mean the same.
- We know that, by substituting a word in c by a synonym, we never make an innocuous sentence suspicious, since we do not alter its meaning.

Instead of enlisting $C = \{Midshires \ is \ a \ ...\}$:

$$C = \textit{Midshires is a} \left\{ egin{array}{l} \textit{nice} \\ \textit{great} \\ \textit{fine} \\ \textit{decent} \\ \textit{wonderful} \end{array} \right\} \textit{little} \left\{ egin{array}{l} \textit{city} \\ \textit{town} \end{array} \right\}$$

Instead of enlisting $M = \{I \text{ don't like } ...\}$:

• We assume that Alice and Bob will exchange arbitrary bitstrings, so $M = \{0, 1\}^*$

Alice and Bob Fool Wendy

 $\textit{Midshires is a} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 00 & \textit{nice} \\ 01 & \textit{great} \\ \textbf{10} & \textit{fine} \\ 11 & \textit{decent} \\ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array} \right\} \textit{little} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 0 & \textit{city} \\ \textbf{1} & \textit{town} \end{array} \right\}.$

- $m_1 = 101$ encodes to $c_1 = \textit{Midshires is a fine little town}$
- $m_2 = 010$ encodes to $c_2 = \textit{Midshires is a great little city}$

Alice and Bob Fool Wendy

$$\textit{Midshires is a} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 00 & \textit{nice} \\ 01 & \textit{great} \\ \textbf{10} & \textit{fine} \\ 11 & \textit{decent} \\ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array} \right\} \textit{little} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 0 & \textit{city} \\ \textbf{1} & \textit{town} \end{array} \right\}.$$

Keith Winstein and Mark Chapman have actually built variants of this system.

Statistic characteristics of the secret message "show trough" to the word-choices in the steganogram!

is a
$$\begin{cases} 00 & nice \\ 01 & great \\ 10 & fine \\ 11 & decent \\ ?? & wonderful \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} \textit{little} \left\{ \begin{array}{cc} 0 & \textit{city} \\ 1 & \textit{town} \end{array} \right\}.$$

•
$$m_0 = 101$$

•
$$m_1 = 001$$

•
$$m_2 = 111$$

$$is \ a \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 00 \quad \textit{nice} \\ 01 \quad \textit{great} \\ 10 \quad \textit{fine} \\ 11 \quad \textit{decent} \\ ?? \quad \textit{wonderful} \end{array} \right\} .$$

- $m_1 = 001$
- $m_2 = 111$
- $m_3 = 101$

$$is \ a \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} \\ 01 & \textit{great} \\ 10 & \textit{fine} \\ 11 & \textit{decent} \\ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array} \right\} \textit{little} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} \\ 1 & \textit{town} \end{array} \right\}.$$

- $m_2 = 111$
- $m_3 = 101$
- $m_4 = 000$

$$is \ a \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} \\ 01 & \textit{great} \\ 10 & \textit{fine} \\ 11 & \textit{decent} \\ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array} \right\} \textit{little} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} \\ 1 & \textit{town} \end{array} \right\}.$$

- $m_3 = 101$
- $m_4 = 000$
- $m_5 = 010$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{lll} 00 & \textit{nice} & | & & & & & & & & \\ 01 & \textit{great} & & & & & & & \\ 10 & \textit{fine} & & || & & & & & \\ 11 & \textit{decent} & | & & & & & \\ ?? & \textit{wonderful} & & & & & & \end{array} \right\} .$$

- $m_4 = 000$
- $m_5 = 010$
- $m_6 = 000$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & || \ 01 & \textit{great} \ 10 & \textit{fine} & || \ 11 & \textit{decent} \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array}
ight\} \textit{little} \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & | \ 1 & \textit{town} & ||| \ \end{array}
ight\}.$$

- $m_5 = 010$
- $m_6 = 000$
- $m_7 = 010$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{lll} 00 & \textit{nice} & || \ 01 & \textit{great} & || \ 10 & \textit{fine} & || \ 11 & \textit{decent} & || \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array}
ight\} \textit{little} \left\{ egin{array}{lll} 0 & \textit{city} & || \ 1 & \textit{town} & ||| \ \end{array}
ight\}.$$

- $m_6 = 000$
- $m_7 = 010$
- $m_8 = 100$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & || \ 10 & \textit{fine} & || \ 11 & \textit{decent} & || \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array}
ight.
ight.
ight. \left. \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & ||| \ 1 & \textit{town} & |||| \ \end{array}
ight.
ight.$$

- $m_7 = 010$
- $m_8 = 100$
- $m_9 = 110$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & || \ 10 & \textit{fine} & || \ 11 & \textit{decent} & || \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array}
ight.
ight.
ight. \left. \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & |||| \ 1 & \textit{town} & |||| \ \end{array}
ight.
ight.$$

- $m_8 = 100$
- $m_9 = 110$
- $m_{10} = 111$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & || \ 10 & \textit{fine} & ||| \ 11 & \textit{decent} & || \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array}
ight.
ig$$

- $m_9 = 110$
- $m_{10} = 111$
- $m_{11} = 100$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & || \ 10 & \textit{fine} & ||| \ 11 & \textit{decent} & || \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array}
ight.
ight.
ight.
ight. \left. \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & |||||| \ 1 & \textit{town} & |||| \ \end{array}
ight.
ight.$$

- $m_{10} = 111$
- $m_{11} = 100$
- $m_{12} = 111$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & || \ 10 & \textit{fine} & ||| \ 11 & \textit{decent} & ||| \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array}
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ight. \left. \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & |||||| \ 1 & \textit{town} & ||||| \ \end{array}
ight.
ight.$$

- $m_{11} = 100$
- $m_{12} = 111$
- $m_{13} = 011$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & || \ 10 & \textit{fine} & |||| \ 11 & \textit{decent} & ||| \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array}
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ight. \left. \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & ||||||| \ 1 & \textit{town} & ||||| \ \end{array}
ight.
ight.$$

- $m_{12} = 111$
- $m_{13} = 011$
- $m_{14} = 011$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & || \ 10 & \textit{fine} & |||| \ 11 & \textit{decent} & |||| \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array}
ight.
ight.$$

- $m_{13} = 011$
- $m_{14} = 011$
- $m_{15} = 000$

- $m_{14} = 011$
- $m_{15} = 000$
- •

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & |||| \ 10 & \textit{fine} & |||| \ 11 & \textit{decent} & |||| \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array}
ight\} \textit{little} \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & ||||||| \ 1 & \textit{town} & ||||||| \ \end{array}
ight\}.$$

- $m_{15} = 000$
- •

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & |||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & |||| \ 10 & \textit{fine} & |||| \ 11 & \textit{decent} & |||| \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array}
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ight. egin{array}{ll} \textit{little} \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & |||||||| \ 1 & \textit{town} & ||||||||| \ \end{array}
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ight.$$

Innocuous covers have statistic characteristics originating from the way native speakers use the language.

$$is \ a \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 00 \quad \textit{nice} \\ 01 \quad \textit{great} \\ 10 \quad \textit{fine} \\ 11 \quad \textit{decent} \\ ?? \quad \textit{wonderful} \end{array} \right\} \textit{little} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 0 \quad \textit{city} \\ 1 \quad \textit{town} \end{array} \right\} .$$

- $c_0 = Midshires$ is a nice little town
- $c_1 = \textit{Midshires is a nice little city}$
- $c_2 = Midshires$ is a nice little town

- $c_1 = Midshires is a nice little city$
- $c_2 = Midshires$ is a nice little town
- $c_3 = Midshires$ is a nice little town

• ...

$$is \ a \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 00 \quad \textit{nice} \\ 01 \quad \textit{great} \\ 10 \quad \textit{fine} \\ 11 \quad \textit{decent} \\ ?? \quad \textit{wonderful} \end{array} \right\} .$$

- $c_2 = \textit{Midshires is a nice little town}$
- $c_3 = Midshires$ is a nice little town
- $c_4 = \textit{Midshires is a nice little city}$

$$is \ a \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 00 \quad \textit{nice} \\ 01 \quad \textit{great} \\ 10 \quad \textit{fine} \\ 11 \quad \textit{decent} \\ ?? \quad \textit{wonderful} \end{array} \right\} .$$

- $c_3 = Midshires$ is a nice little town
- $c_4 = Midshires is a nice little city$
- $c_5 = \textit{Midshires is a great little city}$

• ...

$$is \ a \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 00 \quad \textit{nice} \\ 01 \quad \textit{great} \\ 10 \quad \textit{fine} \\ 11 \quad \textit{decent} \\ ?? \quad \textit{wonderful} \end{array} \right\} \\ \textit{little} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 0 \quad \textit{city} \\ 1 \quad \textit{town} \quad ||| \\ \end{array} \right\}.$$

- $c_4 = Midshires is a nice little city$
- $c_5 = \textit{Midshires is a great little city}$
- $c_6 = Midshires$ is a nice little town

$$is \ a \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||||| \\ 01 & \textit{great} \\ 10 & \textit{fine} \\ 11 & \textit{decent} \\ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array} \right\} \\ \textit{little} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & || \\ 1 & \textit{town} & ||| \end{array} \right\}.$$

- $c_5 = Midshires$ is a great little city
- $c_6 = Midshires$ is a nice little town
- $c_7 = Midshires$ is a decent little town

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & || \ 10 & \textit{fine} & ||| \ 11 & \textit{decent} \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array}
ight.
ight.
ight. \left. \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & ||| \ 1 & \textit{town} & ||| \ \end{array}
ight.
ight.$$

- $c_6 = Midshires$ is a nice little town
- $c_7 = Midshires$ is a decent little town
- $c_8 = \textit{Midshires is a great little town}$

- $c_7 = Midshires$ is a decent little town
- $c_8 = \textit{Midshires is a great little town}$
- $c_9 = Midshires$ is a nice little town

- $c_8 = \textit{Midshires is a great little town}$
- $c_9 = Midshires$ is a nice little town
- $c_{10} = Midshires$ is a wonderful little town

- $c_9 = \textit{Midshires is a nice little town}$
- $c_{10} = Midshires$ is a wonderful little town
- $c_{11} = \textit{Midshires is a great little town}$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||||||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & || \ 10 & \textit{fine} & \ 11 & \textit{decent} & || \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} \end{array}
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ight.
ight. \left. \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & ||| \ 1 & \textit{town} & ||||||| \ \end{array}
ight.
ight.$$

- $c_{10} = Midshires$ is a wonderful little town
- $c_{11} = \textit{Midshires is a great little town}$
- $c_{12} = \textit{Midshires is a great little city}$

$$\left\{ egin{array}{lll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||||||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & || \ 10 & \textit{fine} & || \ 11 & \textit{decent} & || \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} & || \ \end{array}
ight\} \ \textit{little} \left\{ egin{array}{lll} 0 & \textit{city} & ||| \ 1 & \textit{town} & ||||||||| \ \end{array}
ight\}.$$

- $c_{11} = \textit{Midshires is a great little town}$
- $c_{12} = \textit{Midshires is a great little city}$
- $c_{13} = \textit{Midshires is a fine little city}$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||||||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & ||| \ 10 & \textit{fine} & \ 11 & \textit{decent} & || \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} & | \ \end{array}
ight\} egin{array}{ll} \textit{little} \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & ||| \ 1 & \textit{town} & ||||||||| \ \end{array}
ight\}. \end{array}$$

- $c_{12} = \textit{Midshires is a great little city}$
- $c_{13} = \textit{Midshires is a fine little city}$
- $c_{14} = \textit{Midshires is a nice little city}$

- $c_{13} = \textit{Midshires is a fine little city}$
- $c_{14} = \textit{Midshires is a nice little city}$
- $c_{15} = \textit{Midshires is a fine little city}$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & |||||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & |||| \ 10 & \textit{fine} & | \ 11 & \textit{decent} & | \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} & | \ \end{array}
ight\} egin{array}{ll} little \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & ||||| \ 1 & \textit{town} & ||||||||| \ \end{array}
ight\}.$$

- $c_{14} = \textit{Midshires is a nice little city}$
- $c_{15} = \textit{Midshires is a fine little city}$

$$is~a \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 00 & \textit{nice} & ||||||| \ 01 & \textit{great} & |||| \ 10 & \textit{fine} & || \ 11 & \textit{decent} & ||||| \ ?? & \textit{wonderful} & |||| \ \end{array}
ight\} \textit{little} \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & \textit{city} & |||||| \ 1 & \textit{town} & ||||||||| \ \end{array}
ight\}.$$

- $c_{15} = \textit{Midshires is a fine little city}$
- •

This weakness is due to our use of block codes!

101110110010111001011100010100

101110110010111001011100010100

1110110010111001011100010100

001011**10**110010111001011100010100

00

01

10 |

00101110**11**0010111001011100010100

00

01

10 |

0010111011**00**101111001011100010100

00 |

01

10 |

11 |

001011101100**10**1111001011100010100

00 |

01

10 |||

00101110110010**11**1001011100010100

00 |

01

10 ||

0010111011001011**10**01011100010100

00 |

01

10 |||

001011101100101110**01**0111100010100

00 |

01

10 |||

00101110110010111001**01**11100010100

00 |

01 |

10 |||

0010111011001011100101**11**00010100

00

01 |

10 ||||

001011101100101110010111**00**010100

00 |||

01 ||

10 ||||

00101110110010111001011100**01**0100

00 |||

01 ||

10 ||||

0010111011001011100101110001**01**00

00 |||

01 |||

10 |||

001011101100101110010111000101**00**

00 ||||

01 |||

10 ||||

$$egin{array}{lll} 00 & |||| & p = 1/4 & ({f 00}, 01, 10, 11) \ 01 & |||| & p = 1/4 & (00, {f 01}, 10, 11) \ 10 & |||| & p = 1/4 & (00, 01, {f 10}, 11) \ 11 & |||| & p = 1/4 & (00, 01, 10, {f 11}) \ \end{array}$$

This weakness is due to our use of block codes!

However, we can overcome it, by using prefix-free variable length codes.

01000110001001110111101011010

 \bigcirc

0 |

00**10**00110001001110111101011010

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0 ||
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110
1110
1111
```

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0 ||||
10 |
110 |
1110
1111
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10 |
110 |
1110
1111
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0 |||||
10 ||
110 |
1110
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001000110001001110111101011010

The use of prefix free variable length codes in steganography is due to Peter Wayner!


 By word-choice encoding on the basis of a Huffman-code we can provide mimicry.


- By word-choice encoding on the basis of a Huffman-code we can provide **mimicry**.
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
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
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
If it is trivial for Bob to decode a message, then why shouldn't Wendy do the very same thing?















Natural Language Steganography and an "Al-complete" Security Primitive – p.132/182




Natural Language Steganography and an "Al-complete" Security Primitive – p.133/182









Summer camp


sucks! Get me


out of here!


kid writing


home from

summer cam









Wendy's Linguistic Problem

And now to something completely different!

Wendy's Linguistic Problem

And now to something completely different!

Al-complete /A-I k*m-pleet'/ [MIT, Stanford: by analogy with 'NP-complete' (see NP-)] adj. Used to describe problems or subproblems in AI, to indicate that the solution presupposes a solution to the 'strong AI problem' (that is, the synthesis of a human-level intelligence). A problem that is AI-complete is, in other words, just too hard[...]

The Jargon Files

Wendy's Linguistic Problem

Humans can easily solve Al-complete problems.

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- Humans can easily solve Al-complete problems.
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- If reversing our steganographic embedding yields an Al-complete problem, Wendy is truly in trouble.
- We can construct such a system, by using the linguistic problem of word-sense disambiguation.

- It should move through several more drafts.
- It should run through several more drafts.
- It should go through several more drafts.

- It should move through several more drafts.
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- All articles must move through copy-editing.
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$$syn(move) = \{move, run, go\}$$
 ??

- That sermon will move people.
- That sermon will impress people.
- That sermon will strike people.

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Can we conclude that all these words are **generally** synonymous to move?

 $syn(move) = \{move, run, go, impress, strike\}$

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 $syn(move) = \{move, run, go, impress, strike\}$

Unfortunately, we can't.

- It should move through several more drafts.
- It should run through several more drafts.
- It should go through several more drafts.

- It should move through several more drafts.
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BUT

- Your speech must move the audience.
- *Your speech must run the audience.
- Your speech must go the audience.

- That sermon will move people.
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BUT

- All articles must move through copy-editing.
- *All articles must impress through copy-editing.
- *All articles must strike through copy-editing.

We cannot include a synset like

$$syn(move) = \{move, run, go, impress, strike\}$$

in a dictionary!

All we can do is to state that

```
\operatorname{syn}(c_1,\operatorname{move}) = \{\operatorname{move},\operatorname{run},\operatorname{go}\}\

\operatorname{syn}(c_2,\operatorname{move}) = \{\operatorname{move},\operatorname{impress},\operatorname{strike}\}
```

for some linguistic contexts $c_1 \neq c_2$.

Recall the way our encoder works:

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 That sermon will impress people
- We have a set of words that can be replaced for this {move, impress, strike}
- We assign codewords to them like $move \rightarrow 0$, $impress \rightarrow 10$, $strike \rightarrow 11$
- To send a secret 0, we transmit That sermon will move people

How would Wendy steganalyze this?

• She intercepts

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- However, there will be multiple codes for this:
 - move → 0, impress → 10, strike → 11 (correct)
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- In order to decode this replacement, Wendy has to solve an instance of the Al-complete problem of word-sense ambiguity!

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Please see the provided references for these things!

This slide-set is not a self-contained publication. Please conduct the references instead.

In particular, note that sources were not properly cited in this slide-set. See the citations given in the project-report for reference on sources.

References

Natural Language Steganography and an "Al-complete" Security Primitive

for reference, see:

- Richard Bergmair. Towards linguistic steganography: A systematic investigation of approaches, systems, and issues. April 2004.
- Richard Bergmair and Stefan Katzenbeisser. Towards human interactive proofs in the text-domain.
 September 2004.

Available online: http://bergmair.cjb.net/